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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This thesis explains the changes and shifts in the foreign, security and 
economic policies of Romania during the 1990s by defining the challenges during 
the transition period of the country. In the early 1990s, Romania, carrying the burden 
of the communist period, made certain changes in its structures towards democracy. 
This study examines the basic issues in the agenda of Romania during the 1990s by 
focusing on Romania’s strive for becoming a NATO and EU member, its economic 
transformation and development and the country’s role in the regional politics. 
Although Romania’s desire for membership in NATO and EU was strongly 
supported by the government and the Romanian people, the country’s admission to 
both institutions was delayed because of the economic instabilities. Besides 
economic restructuring efforts in this period, Romania also struggled for achieving 
peace, prosperity and stability in the Balkans, thus it cooperated with other nations 
and established exemplary relations with them as in the cases of Turkey and Greece. 
These bilateral relations, which were based on friendship and mutual respect, can be 
useful for Romania in its transition in terms of obtaining the support of those 
countries for also the membership process to NATO and EU; however, the Romanian 
economy should be the priority: The objective should be the smooth transition of the 
Romanian economy into a well-structured, functioning market system step by step, 
first reorganizing itself and then adapting to other international institutions. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
Bu tez, Romanya’nın 1990’larda dış, güvenlik ve ekonomik politikalarındaki 
değişimleri ve yönelimleri, ülkenin geçiş döneminde karşılaştığı güçlüklere atıfta 
bulunarak anlatmaktadır. 1990’ların başlarında, komünist dönemin yükünü taşıyan 
Romanya, yapılarında demokratikleşme yönünde bir takım değişiklikler yapmıştır. 
Bu çalışma, ülkenin Avrupa Birliği ve NATO’ya üyelik çabalarına, ekonomik 
değişim ve gelişimine, ve de ülkenin bölgesel politika içerisindeki rolüne 
odaklanarak 1990’larda Romanya’nın gündemindeki temel konuları incelemektedir. 
Romanya’nın Avrupa Birliği ve NATO’ya üye olma isteği hükümet ve Romen halkı 
tarafından kuvvetli bir şekile desteklenmesine rağmen ülkenin bu iki kuruluşa üyeliği 
ekonomik istikrarsızlıklar sebebiyle gecikmiştir. Bu dönemdeki ekonomik yapılanma 
çabalarının yanısıra, Romanya aynı zamanda Balkanlarda barışı, refahı ve istikrarı 
sağlamak için çabalamaktadır ve bu sebeple Türkiye ve Yunanistan örneklerinde 
olduğu üzere diğer ülkelerle de örnek ilişkiler kurarak işbirliğini arttırmaktadır. 
Dostluğa ve karşılıklı saygıya dayanan bu ikili ilişkiler, Romanya’nın geçiş 
döneminde bu ülkelerden Avrupa Birliği ve NATO’ya üyelik sürecini de kapsayarak 
gerekli desteği alması açısından yararlı olmaktadır; ancak Romanya ekonomisi 
önceliği teşkil etmelidir. Amaç, Romanya ekonomisinin öncelikle iyi yapılanmış, 
işleyen bir piyasa sistemine adım adım geçiş yapması, önce kendini yeniden 
düzenlemesi ve daha sonra da diğer uluslararası kuruluşlara kendini adapte etmesidir.  
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     INTRODUCTION 
 
     Global and regional politics have witnessed major repercussions by the end of the 
Cold War and the resulting superpower competition. By the 1990s, momentous 
changes occurred in Central and Southeastern Europe and the region had been 
profoundly affected by the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the 
proliferation of new states and the eruption of violent ethno-national conflicts. After 
decades of central planning, autarchy, bureaucracies and biased prices, the period of 
transition into democratic structures and market economies came to the fore. 
     After the 1989 overthrow of the communist regime, Romania faced the challenge 
of transition much more than any other ex-socialist Central European country. The 
cumulative effects of the fully state-owned economy, hypercentralised management 
system, lack of Western technology and competitiveness of national production 
marked the beginning of a painful economic transformation period. 
     In addition to democracy and free market economy, the national interest also 
incorporated security and prosperity for Romania. Therefore, by taking these values 
as a basis, Romania changed the route of its foreign, security and economic policies 
in the 1990s. 
     The purpose of this thesis is to explain the changes and shifts in the foreign, 
security and economic policies of Romania during the 1990s by referring to the 
challenges in the transition period of the country. It focuses on mainly Romania’s 
drive to become a NATO and EU member, economic transformation and 
development and the country’s role in regional politics by assessing the significance 
of all these actors for the future evolution of Romania in the region.  
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     The thesis is composed of four chapters: 
     The first chapter includes a description of the historical evolution of Romanian 
politics by highlighting each phase beginning from the origins of communism in the 
country to the overthrow of communism with the 1989 Revolution. In addition to 
these, it provides information about Ceausescuism by analyzing the foreign, security 
and economic policies during Nicolae Ceausescu’s reign. 
     The second chapter deals with the security approaches of Romania in the 1990s. It 
stresses the importance of integration to the Western and European institutions for 
Romania and the country’s drive to become a NATO and EU member. The chapter 
gives the details of the preparation processes for both institutions and mentions the 
difficulties that Romania faced in this period. 
     The third chapter points to the economic legacies of Ceausescu by demonstrating 
the characteristic features of the Romanian economy in the early 1990s. It continues 
with the reforms in the economy of Romania adopted by the beginning of transition 
period. Additionally, it makes a comparison between the economic conditions before 
the 1980s and late 1990s by looking at statistical indicators. 
     Finally, the last chapter examines Romania’s Balkan policy and underlines the 
country’s active role and rapprochement policies in the 1990s. Furthermore, the 
significance of improving bilateral relations and taking part in regional organizations 
for Romania is described by citing its political, economic and cultural relations with 
Turkey and Greece as examples.    
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CHAPTER I 
 
EVOLUTION OF ROMANIAN POLITICS 
                            
1.1 ORIGINS OF COMMUNISM IN ROMANIA 
 
 
Romania, which was constituted of two semi-independent states, Wallachia and 
Moldovia, remained under Ottoman domination until the nineteenth century.  The 
Romanians were of Dacian-Roman origin with Slavic and Tatar strains. Stemming 
from centuries of Slavic, Turkish and Greek influence and foreign domination in 
political, economic and cultural fields, Romanian nationalism appeared late in 1848 
and developed slowly. After struggling for its national independence, Romania had 
to take part in both world wars and to deal with the Great Powers. Both in the First 
and Second World Wars, the country diplomatically dallied with both sides and 
gained a historical reputation for international unreliability.1 
In World War I, Romania had joined the Allies and was overwhelmingly 
defeated in the war. With the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest on May 7, 1918, 
Romania ceded Dobruja to Bulgaria and the Carpathian to Austria-Hungary.  
                                                          
1 L.S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), 339-347 
and J. F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule (London, Durham: Duke University Press, 
1988), 263.  
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     In return, the Romanians were able to gain immediate compensation for their 
losses and they acquired Bessarabia, which had been a part of the Russian Empire 
since 1812. Therefore, the province became an important  source of tension between 
the two countries during the interwar period.2  
The position of the country was similar in the Second World War because 
Romania began as combatant on the side of the Axis and then switched to the Allies 
very late in the war.  After fighting side by side with the Axis powers, Romania had 
suffered severe losses on the Russian front. By 1942-1943, the Romanians wanted to 
negotiate with the Western powers in order to block the approaching Russians. In  
early 1944, King Michael had begun to express his own sympathy for the Allies and 
distaste for the Germans. King Michael’s coup of 23 August 1944 opened the way 
into the Balkans for the Red Army. Romania was the first Balkan country to fall to 
the advancing Red Army in April 1944. At this date, Romania presented her 
acceptance of Allied surrender terms and she was no longer at war with Russia. This  
marked the beginning of the strong Soviet influence and communism in Romania. It 
also marked the end of the old order and the day of enslavement for the 
anticommunists.3 
The Romanian Communist Party (RCP) was established in 1921 but it did not 
provide an effective basis for the operation of the communist movement in Romania. 
In 1932, the RCP was reorganized and adopted a more militant course of action. The 
leading figures of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) such as Gheorghiu-Dej, 
Gheorghe Apostol, Nicolae Ceausescu and Miron Constantinescu were in control of 
the Romanian communist movement during the coup of 23 August 1944.4  
                                                          
2 L.S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, 564-566. 
3 L.S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, 810-811. 
4 Dinu C. Giurescu and Stephen Fischer-Galati, eds., Romania: A Historic Perspective (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998), 393-397.  
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The Armistice Agreement signed in Moscow on September 12, 1944, formalized 
the predominance of the Soviet Union in Romania. After the conclusion of the 
agreement, Romania took an active part in the war against Germany.5 The other 
agreement, which strengthened the position of the Soviet Union in Romania, was the 
Churchill-Stalin Percentage Agreement signed on October 9, 1944 in Moscow. 
According to this agreement, the Soviet Union had been given 90 percent of 
influence in Romania and 75 percent of influence in Bulgaria. In other words, while 
Churchill had only given an influence of 90 percent  in Greece, the Soviet Union had 
become advantageous and dominant in both of the other countries. Finally, in early 
1945, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences had clearly indicated the division of the 
Balkans between the Western powers and the Soviet Union.6  
Generally, by becoming dominant in Romania, the aim of the Soviet Union was 
to prevent the establishment of a bourgeois, pro-western regime in that country. 
Therefore, the Soviets took an important step in Romania by demanding of the 
government the resignation of General Nicolae Radescu, who was exercising his 
independence and opposing the communist takeover, particularly in the military. The 
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky delivered an ultimatum to King Michael 
and demanded the appointment of Petru Groza as the head of the government. As a 
result, the communists and the new government, which was directly controlled by the 
Soviet Union, were in charge on March 6, 1945.7 In the Groza Government, the 
leaders of the communist movement in Romania, Patrascanu and Georghiu-Dej 
                                                          
5 Andrei Otetea, ed., The History of the Romanian People (New York: Twayne Publishers Inc., 1970), 
571-572. 
6 Oral Sander, Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye (1945-1965) (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1969), 18-20. 
see also Misha Glenny, Balkanlar (1804-1999) (İstanbul: Sabah Yayınları, 2001), 421-422.  
7 Armanda Alonso Pinerio, History of Modern Romania (Buenos Aires: Esta Edicion, 1999), 242.  
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maintained their positions as the Minister of Justice and the Minister of 
Transportation respectively.8  
The Soviet Union had closely controlled the Groza Government and tried to 
inject its own principles. Romania had become a satellite country. “The Romanian 
Orthodox Church was completely subordinated to the state and never acted to oppose 
the communists. The Uniate Church, a branch of Catholicism, was also forced to 
unite with the Romania Orthodox Church.”9 On December 1947, King Michael was 
forced to abdicate by Petru Groza, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and 
Gheorghiu-Dej, Secretary-General of the Romanian Communist Party and to flee the 
country. At the end of the 1948 elections, Romania became a People’s Republic and 
a new constitution was established.10   
Gheorghiu-Dej was one of the leading figures that tried to strengthen the role of 
Romania in the Soviet bloc. Between 1945 and 1952, he devoted most of his time to 
shape Romania according to the principles of the Soviet Union. “Romania nullified 
existing agreements and traditional ties with France, Italy and the West in general 
and outdid other Communist states in the virulence of its denunciation of Western 
imperialism.”11 However, the death of Stalin in 1953 affected the course of actions in 
the Russian-Romanian relations. 
Gheorghiu-Dej and his close associates identified themselves with Stalinism and 
rejected “Khruschevs’s de-Stalinization policies, in part to prevent Khruschev from 
installing his own allies in positions of power in Romania.”12 As early as 1955, 
Romanian Communists changed their road to socialism by reducing Russian 
                                                          
8 Kamuran Gürün, Dış İlişkiler ve Türk Politikası (1939’dan günümüze kadar) (Ankara: Ankara 
Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1983), 218-219. 
9 James K. McCollum, Is Communism Dead Forever? (USA: University Press of America, 1998), 15. 
10 Kamuran Gürün, Dış İlişkiler ve Türk Politikası (1939’dan günümüze kadar), 218-219. 
11 Peter A. Toma, ed., The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe (USA: The University of 
Arizona Press, 1970), 20.   
12 “Romania”, http://www.lib.msu.edu/sowards/balkan/lect22.htm. 
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influence. The new Romanian regime favored cooperation and integration with other 
states, regardless of their social systems and recognized the principles of 
international equality and of noninterference in domestic affairs.13 Conclusion of the 
Warsaw Pact in 1955 was supported by the country but Khruschev’s reorganization 
of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)14 in this year created 
tension in Romania. Probably like Bulgaria and Albania, Romania was pressured to 
cancel its industrialization plans and to concentrate on developing its agriculture and 
food industries. It was identified as a source of grains. The reply of the country to 
such an economic exploitation was to apply an independent policy from the bloc.15 
Therefore, Romania preferred to pursue economic self-sufficiency but her attitude 
was regarded as “protectionism” by other socialist states.16  
After being elected as the President of Romania in 1961, Gheorghiu-Dej was 
inclined towards the West and tried to establish “relations of the new type” with all 
nations. The continuing rejection of Romania’s claims by Russia, Czechoslovakia 
and East Germany led her to adopt national and international policies of an 
increasingly independent nature. Therefore, Romania publicized “the rejection of 
Russia’s hegemony in the bloc and leadership of the camp, and the statement of 
Romanian independence” in April 1964. After the death of Gheorghiu-Dej in March 
1965, Nicolae Ceausescu succeeded him and even changed the shape of communism 
in Romania.17 
 
 
                                                          
13 Dinu C. Giurescu and Stephen Fischer-Galati, eds.,  Romania: A Historic Perspective, 447-449. 
14 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) was established by Stalin in 1949 but 
after 1956 it was revived by Khrushchev as an instrument for bloc cohesion. 
15 J. F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule, 266-267. 
16 Dinu C. Giurescu and Stephen Fischer-Galati, eds.,  Romania: A Historic Perspective, 447-449. 
17 ibid., pp.454-461. 
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1.2 AN INTOLERANT LEADER: NICOLAE CEAUSESCU AND 
CEAUSESCUISM 
Beginning from March 1965 to December 1989, a period of twenty-five years is 
known as the “Age of Ceausescu”, the years that witnessed the intolerant leader, 
Nicolae Ceausescu’s struggle for absolute power. Most of his political credentials, 
which were acquired during his early ages, had been directly influential in 
Ceausescu’s ambition to rule Romania as an independent and nationalistic country. 
After the Second World War, he had served as head of the Union of Communist 
Youth, later as the chief of the political directorate of the armed forces, secretary of 
the Central Committee and member of the Political Bureau of the Party.18  
When he replaced Gheorgiu-Dej in March 1965, he became a member of a 
collective leadership, including the Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer and the 
President of the State Council, the veteran communist Chivu Stoica. However, from 
the beginning of his rule, Ceausescu’s main aim was to consolidate his control over 
the party and gradual enchroachment on the powers of the government. He achieved 
his aims at the Eleventh Party Congress in November 1974, by becoming the 
absolute leader of Romania, assuming the dual role of President of the country and 
General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP).19  
The first steps taken by Ceausescu were the change in the country’s name from 
“Romanian People’s Republic” to “Socialist Republic of Romania” and the 
replacement of the 1952 constitution with that of 1965 which reflected Romanian 
independence as a sovereign national state. The new constitution eliminated all 
allusions to dependence on the Soviet Union and included declarations of 
                                                          
18 Dinu C. Giurescu and Stephen Fischer-Galati, eds., Romania: A Historic Perspective, 462-464. 
19 ibid. 
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inviolability of national sovereign rights.20  He used the Constitution as an instrument 
for serving his own needs. He asked: “Did the Constitution make us, or did we make 
it? We made the Constitution. We’ll change it if we have to.”21 Ceausescu 
proclaimed “multi-lateral development” as the state policy and in 1975, he clearly 
announced its primary objectives as “the unification of a diverse population into “one 
working people”; the reduction and elimination of disparities in economic 
development between the various regions; the elimination of differences in living 
standards and life-styles between city and countryside; and the achievement of equal 
occupational opportunity.”22  
Ceausescu was also the founder of the “dynamic socialism” since his wife Elena, 
his son, his three brothers and his brother-in-law had been included in the ruling 
elite. Therefore, ruling Romania turned out to be a politicized family business. He 
introduced himself as the greatest Romanian leader of all time, the defender of his 
people’s interest and a genuine nationalist.23  
As a result of all these characteristics, Ceausescu created “Ceausescuism”, which 
was a form of national and personal communism. He played a key role in the 
development of Romanian nationalism but in reality, he had isolated himself from 
Romanian people. He believed that he was providing guidance and inspiration for all 
Romanians but he was not able to communicate with the masses in a meaningful 
manner.24 Ceausescu was the supreme leader, the supreme military commander, the 
supreme hero of the working class, the supreme builder and the supreme theoretician 
                                                          
20 Peter A. Toma, ed., The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe (USA: The University of 
Arizona Press, 1970), 30. 
21 James K. McCollum, Is Communism Dead Forever? (USA: University Press of America, 1998), 18. 
22 Tom Gallagher, Romania After Ceausescu (Great Britain: Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 
1995), 61. 
23 “Romania”, http://www.lib.msu.edu/sowards/balkan/lect22.htm. 
24Paul Brooker, Twentieth-Century Dictatorships-The Ideological One-Party States (New York: 
Washington Square, New York University Press, 1995), 90.  
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(his work “Way of Building Up the Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society”, 
thirty volumes concerning Romania was published).25   
Ceausescu also modified the structure of the Romanian communist regime in a 
way that the police, the paramilitary security force and the Securitate became the 
regime’s most powerful organization.26  “He stressed organic government in which 
the leader and the people live in a harmonious and fundamentally necessary 
relationship; one in which the leader is indispensable, but the masses are not. This 
was clearly a vision of direct rule over the masses, not in conjunction with them, or 
their representatives.”27 In sum, Romania had become a closed society, subject to 
intense repression, international isolation and cultural decline.28  
 
1.3 ROMANIA’S FOREIGN, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY POLICIES 
DURING THE COLD WAR  
Until 1967, Romania’s foreign relations represented the “objective international 
conditions” for securing the country’s independence. The Romanian independent 
course was first initiated by Gheorghiu-Dej and continued after Ceausescu’s 
ascendancy.29 Ceausescu preferred to follow an autonomous policy in foreign and 
security matters and he thought he was the defender of Romania’s interests against 
interference in its internal affairs by the Soviet Union.30 According to him, Romanian 
power and prestige in the world carried utmost importance and they could only be 
achieved through manipulation, maneuverability and the personal capabilities of the 
                                                          
25 Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, Eastern Europe-The Great Transformation (1985-1991) (USA: 
Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1992), 28-29.  
26 Paul Brooker, Twentieth-Century Dictatorships-The Ideological One-Party States, 90. 
27 Trond Gilberg, Nationalism and Communism in Romania (San Francisco: Westview Press, 
Boulder, 1990), 47-51. 
28 Tom Gallagher, Romania After Ceausescu, 61. 
29 Peter A. Toma, ed., The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe, 31.   
30 Paul S. Shoup, ed., Problems of Balkan Security-Southeastern Europe in the 1990s (Washington 
D.C.: The Wilson Center Press, 1990), 51. 
 11
leader.31 In addition, Ceausescu’s policy advocated “the maintenance of peaceful 
relations among all sovereign states, regardless of their social and political 
orientation, and was directed against Soviet Union’s growing determination to 
reimpose hegemony in the bloc and the camp.”32 He also believed that Romania 
could be a bridge between East and West, so the country should be very careful in its 
long term relations.33  
Ceausescu, like many other Romanian leaders, was seeking security in the 
doctrine of European unity. Therefore, he believed in the necessity of the liquidation 
of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO to establish a European Security system. To 
Romania, disarmament should be a priority for states’ foreign policies in order to 
establish peace and security in Europe.34 
As a first step to European unity, Romania was the first communist country to 
establish formal diplomatic relations with the German Federal Republic in January 
1967. Moreover, he had voluntarily carried the role of potential mediator of the 
Arab-Israel conflict and a potential liaison between the United States and China 
during the Vietnam War. He “refused to allow Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Romanian 
territory and withstood the imposition of restrictions on Romania’s economic 
development by COMECON.”35 Romania put its determination into the scene by 
refusing to participate in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 
1968.36 In 1969, state visits by Harold Wilson, Charles de Gaulle and Richard Nixon 
signalled Western appreciation for Ceausescu’s moderate relations in foreign and 
domestic affairs.37 Especially after 1970, Romania’s relations with the West, 
                                                          
31 Trond Gilberg, Nationalism and Communism in Romania, 224. 
32 Fevzi Şirinli, Romanya ve Ceausescu (İstanbul: Haşmet Matbaası, 1974), 211. 
33 Trond Gilberg, Nationalism and Communism in Romania, 224. 
34 Fevzi Şirinli, Romanya ve Ceausescu, 215-218. 
35 Dinu C. Giurescu and Stephen Fischer-Galati, eds., Romania: A Historic Perspective, 464-465. 
36 Misha Glenny, Balkanlar (1804-1999) (İstanbul: Sabah Yayınları, 2001), 475. 
37 ibid. 
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particularly, the US, the Federal Republic of Germany and France, considerably 
improved and intensified. Ceausescu, by pursuing a highly personal diplomacy, 
conducted many visits to these countries.38 
These official visits strengthened economic ties with the West. The establisment 
of joint Romanian-Western companies for industrial and commercial development 
began in 1971. Romania joined the World Bank and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1971 and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
1972. “Most Favored Nation” (MFN) trade rights were granted by the US in 1972, 
and the Common Market opened special ties with Romania in 1973. In 1974, 
Russia’s share of foreign trade in 1965 fell from 39 percent to 16 percent.39  
The development of the Romanian economy constituted an important part of 
Ceausescu’s policies because it was important for him to live well and free in a 
communist Romania and make the country safe from external pressures exerted by 
COMECON. However, in the late 1970s, Romania’s relations with the West were 
damaged considerably for both political and economic reasons. Particularly the US 
and France could remain no more silent in the face of Romania’s violations of human 
rights and espionage. In the U.S Congress, the regime’s civil rights practices and 
treatment of religious and ethnic minorities drew attention and were criticized. In 
1987, Romania unilaterally renounced MFN.40  
Romania and Albania were the most centralized and rigidly planned economies 
in Eastern Europe by the end of 1970s but Romania experienced an economic crisis 
during the 1980s. Several reasons of the crisis could be explained by:41 
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- The determination of the regime to continue the rapid development of large-scale 
heavy industry at all costs; 
- a refusal to reform the extremely centralised economic system; and 
- a failure to revitalise the agricultural sector, which suffered from a depletion and 
degradation of its human resources and adverse economic conditions. 
Ceausescu’s Five Year Plan (1976-80) had resulted in ample supplies of 
inexpensive energy, rise in agricultural production and increase in labor 
productivity.42 In addition, since the Romanian economic plan for 1981-85 paid little 
attention to the difficult economic situation, insisted on continuing rapid growth 
along the same lines and set even higher goals, the country’s economic situation 
worsened. Romania’s dependency on expensive foreign oil and iron ore raised the 
level of country’s foreign debt.43 In 1982, Ceausescu announced that the foreign debt 
was to be paid back to avoid compromising the country’s independence. In order to 
achieve this, a large export surplus was necessary. Therefore, agricultural output had 
to be diverted from meeting internal food needs to sale on the external market.44 
From 1981 to 1988, because of Ceausescu’s policy of no foreign debt, the exports of 
Romania were, on the average, 26.8 percent more per year than its imports. By the 
mid-1980s, serious food and energy shortages emerged as a result of agricultural 
exports together with the inefficiency of production methods and the rise in the cost 
of electricity, gasoline and natural gas.45  
Ceausescu wanted Romania to be self-sufficient in manufacturing and he brought 
in outside technologies in order to have heavy industries and become an “industrial 
nation”. Therefore, in the 1980s, Romania possessed one of the largest steel 
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producing capacities in the world with huge integrated steel mills at Galati, Calarasi, 
Resita, Hunedoara, Calan and Tirgoviste.46 By paying less attention to consumer 
goods, Ceausescu was unaware of the problems facing Romania. He just tried to 
fulfill the unrealistic goals of a highly personalized command economy. By 1985, the 
majority of Romanian people had started to oppose Ceausescu and his unconcious 
policies but his reply to all these oppositions was in the form of applying even tighter 
measures.47 
On the other hand, one of Ceausescu’s goals was “social and national 
homogenisation”. He claimed that “because a nation had been created by centuries of 
living together, Hungarians, Germans and other groups were part of the Romanian 
nation.”48 While trying to preserve national unity, he tried to clear the distinct 
elements within the borders of Romania. He made a plan to destroy villages for 
establishing huge agricultural units, the so called “agroalimentary centers”. The real 
target of this plan was the inhabitants of Transylvania and the Banat, who had 
relatively higher standards of living than Ceausescu’s people and were in closer 
contact with Hungarian and Yugoslav forms of economic and political 
organization.49 Romania was firmly experiencing the monopoly of power by 
Ceausescu and his wife, Elena. Therefore, by the end of the 1980s, “Ceausescuism” 
led to the loss of Romania’s trade relations with the US, to the destruction of Franco-
Romanian relations and to the establishment of anti-Romanianism of the Thatcher 
regime in Great Britain.50 
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In sum, Nicolae Ceausescu and his family lived in an imagined world by 
isolating Romania from other states but the end of the story was coming close as the 
socioeconomic conditions and foreign relations of the country deteriorated day by 
day. 
 
1.4 THE 1989 REVOLUTION AND THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY 
By the end of the 1980s, the situation in Romania had become explosive: “the 
population was desperate, the economy was in shambles, and the dictatorial-
personalistic regime of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu, based primarily on repression, 
was structurally fragile.”51 Beside these domestic factors, the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall on November 9, 1989, the “velvet revolution” in Czechoslovakia and the fall of 
communism in most of Eastern Europe led Romanians to think once more of the fate 
of the country and fired them to take action immediately.52  
As defined by Theda Skocpol in her comparison of the great revolutions:  
Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state 
and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried 
through by class-based revolts from below. Social revolutions are set 
apart from other sorts of conflicts and transformative processes above 
all by the combination…of societal structural change with class 
upheaval…and of political with social transformation53. 
 
     Skocpol further states that “social revolutions are not made; they come” and “a 
revolution’s outcome is as important in defining it as a revolution as the type of 
actors involved in the overthrow of an old regime and the actions that they undertake 
to ensure a change in power.”54 In this perspective, the Romanian revolution could be 
defined as the most bloody of all in Eastern Europe because Ceausescu was the only 
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communist ruler to give the order to shoot without considering the consequences and 
the army and the Securitate confronted each other with weapons.55 
     On the other hand, as Vladimir Pasti describes in his book, “The Challenges of 
Transition”, the Romanian revolution had an ideology in itself which was more 
important than just blaming the country’s economic and social disaster on the rulers. 
One part of the ideology supported that nobody had anything against Romania but 
against Ceausescu personally and the other part stated that Romania was a rich 
country with a big potential and they were irrationally wasted by the rulers’ whims. 
However, some people, namely technical intelligentsia, knew how to use and benefit 
from the country’s wealth and potential. Under the light of these two factors that 
constituted the ideology behind the revolution, the solution was very simple: “replace 
the impotent rulers with those who are naturally competent.”56 
     The Romanian revolution was triggered off in Timisoara by a pastor of the 
Reformed Church and a member of the Hungarian ethnic minority, named Reverend 
Laszlo Tokes. He was an advocate of human and religious rights, and he was 
transferred to another parish in a smaller town by the use of force. He refused to obey 
the official decision and the act of civil disobedience sparked off a rebellion in 
Romania.57 
     On December 16-17, anti-Ceausescu and anti-Communist groups, including 
students and massive groups of workers, began mass demonstrations. Ceausescu was 
out of the country on a state visit to Iran but he was sure about his security and the 
ability of the military forces to cope with these actions. He ordered his army and 
security elements to repress the rebellion by force. The Securitate forces killed many 
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people in Timisoara but the army was unwilling to fire on Romanians. When he 
returned to Romania, the protests were beginning to spread to other cities. 
     From the time of the first demonstrations in Timisoara on December 16 and 17 to 
December 22, the East European, Yugoslav and Soviet media were actively reporting 
all developments in Romania. During the fighting between Ceausescu’s forces and 
revolutionaries, the Soviet Union offered humanitarian aid to the supporters of the 
new regime but refused to intervene militarily. On the other hand, the Hungarian 
Socialist Party (HSP), the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) and the 
Czechoslovak Communist Party had all decided to suspend relations with the 
Romanian Communist Party (RCP). The Bulgarian Government cut all ties with the 
Romanian Government. Both NATO and the Council of Europe stated their 
opposition to the repression in Romania and the European Community announced 
that it would freeze or cancel the pacts negotiated with Romania.58 
     On December 20, Ceausescu addressed the nation on the radio and television and 
he blamed all the people in the events as “hooligans” and “fascists”. However, he 
could not calm down the demonstrators and his most trusted elements, the armed 
forces joined the masses on December 22. Therefore, Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu 
fled the country by helicopter on the same day.59 A few hours later, the National 
Salvation Front (NSF) filled the power vacuum and assumed governmental 
responsibilities. 
     Following the departure of the Ceausescus and the establishment of the new 
government, statements of support came from state, party, opposition and religious 
leaders in all countries. The West applauded both the courage of Romanian citizens 
to end the Ceausescu dictatorship and the army for joining the revolution against 
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Ceausescu’s Securitate.60 Hungary was the first country to recognize the new 
government and establish contact with them on December 23. Yugoslavia followed 
suit on December 25 and the list of recognition continued with Bulgaria, Poland, East 
Germany and Czechoslovakia.  
     The United States moved quickly for the reestablishment of good relations with 
Romania and stated its support for a democratic change. The European Economic 
Community cancelled its suspension of the Generalized System of Preferences on 
December 29. The Soviet Foreign Minister Edvard Shevardnadze organized an 
official visit to Romania on January 6 and promised continuing economic and 
humanitarian aid. In turn, the new Romanian Government expressed the continuation 
of Romania’s foreign commitments, including its membership in the Warsaw Pact.61 
The NSF had actively participated in the revolution and included ex-communists 
such as Ion Iliescu, Petre Roman, Silviu Brucan, Corneliu Manescu, General Victor 
Stanculescu, Alexander Birladeanu and Dan Martian.62 The Ceausescus were 
captured on December 22 and they were sentenced to death by the Secret Military 
Tribunal. The NSF had promised for a public trial but three days later, they had been 
executed.63  
     By the end of 1989, the NSF Council expanded to 145 members, Ion Iliescu 
remained Chairman of the Council and the interim President of the Republic and 
Petre Roman became the Prime Minister of an interim government.64 The new 
government issued a ten-point programme which “stipulated the introduction of a  
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democratic, pluralist form of government and the abolition of the leading role of a 
single party; the holding of free elections; the separation of powers; the elimination 
of centralised economic management and the promotion of initiative and skills in all 
economic sectors; the restructuring of agriculture and the promotion of small-scale 
production; the reorganisation of education; the observance of the rights and 
freedoms of ethnic minorities; the reorganisation of trade and the halting of food 
exports; and the conduct of foreign policy in the interest of the people.”65  
     The Romanian government was aware of the fact that basic reforms were 
necessary for Western financial assistance. Iliescu’s first reform was the 
liberalisation of prices in the spring of 1991 and the passage of privatisation law in 
August 1991. Additionally, a new constitution took effect on December 13, 1991.  
     However, the split in the NSF became more apparent before the 1992 elections. 
The conservative faction, supported by Iliescu, formed the Democratic National 
Salvation Front (FSND, from May 1993 the Democratic Party-FSN or PD-FSN) and 
Roman’s reformist faction acted under the name of FSN(Frontul Salvarii Nationale 
or NSF) until July 1993 (renamed as Social Democracy Party of Romania). In the 
1992 parliamentary elections, the FSND became the largest party with strong support 
of rural areas and won more than a quarter of the vote. Iliescu also won over 60 
percent of the vote in the presidential elections.66 To conclude, in late 1989, Romania 
was sailing through democracy after about forty years.   
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1.5 ROMANIA IN TRANSITION: FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
PRIORITIES 
     Romania’s ability was “constrained by the country’s relative isolation from the 
West during the first two post-Ceausescu years, by disastrous economic conditions 
and by the lack of a firm domestic political consensus.”67 NSF was aware of the fact 
that Romania’s poor image was a product of the country’s bureaucracy, disorder, 
socio-political instability, strikes and corruption.68 
A free market and a free government were not sufficient for Romania’s national 
security. Therefore, the Romanian Defense Ministry emphasized the need to 
depoliticize and professionalize the army and to give top priority to qualitative 
aspects in all areas of national defense. Romania tried to cooperate with regional and 
multilateral security organizations such as the Danubian Cooperation, the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and Balkan Cooperation.69 
With the fall of communism, a period of transition had begun for Romania in 
political, social and economic fields. The country wanted to become a reliable 
partner regarding its human and economic potentials, a stability factor by developing 
normal relations with neighboring states and to become integrated into the Euro-
Atlantic institutions.70 Therefore, in the 1990s, Romania’s main action guidelines for 
promoting national security and regional stability could be summarized as:71 
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 The promotion of partnership relations and the preparation of the conditions for 
entering NATO and the European structures- European Communities, Western 
European Union and the Council of Europe; 
 Presence in the regional and sub-regional projects; 
 Setting up of a frame of bilateral agreements and treaties; 
 Avoidance of committment to any military adventure. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
SECURITY APPROACHES OF ROMANIA: NATO AND EU 
           
     2.1 ROMANIA AND NATO 
 
 
With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the emergence of newly democratic 
states in the early 1990s, NATO began to shift its attention and to address resources 
to the southern region.72 However, in the short-term, the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia was a major problem in NATO’s southern flank to take center stage and 
for the Balkans to become a NATO priority. The Balkan nations, emerged from 
communist ideology and Cold War geopolitics, showed great interest for establishing 
economic, political and security links with the West. For most of them, “a key 
component of such linkages was involvement with NATO”.73 One of those countries, 
which placed membership to NATO as a priority strategic objective of the security 
and defense policy, was Romania.74 From the Romanian perspective, the option for 
integration into NATO was “based both on the national interest of belonging to a 
secure environment and on the international interest of cooperating in building this 
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environment together. This option was also rooted in the general effort of 
establishing as broadly as possible a democratic, stable and prosperous region in the 
Euro-Atlantic area.”75 Since the Alliance consists of democratic countries which had 
very well defined values (democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law) on the 
international platform, Romania had  a strong enthusiasm to move over to the 
Western World and share those countries’ values and ideals.76  
From the very beginning of the enlargement process of NATO, Romania’s 
preparation to join the alliance became a top priority objective of the country’s 
domestic policy. Integration into NATO was supported by overwhelming majority of 
the population and by all the political forces. Polls showed that popular support for 
joining NATO was no less than 95 percent of Romanians and about 90 percent 
among the military.77 There were two basic reasons for this popular support: first, “in 
the eyes of the Romanian political leaders and the public at large, NATO has proven, 
over a period of almost five decades, the capability to guarantee the security of its 
member states, to stabilize relations among them and to foster their economic 
prosperity and democratic development under the rule of law, and second, 
historically, Romania has been linked to NATO countries by long traditions, 
common patterns of culture and civilization, and by shared democratic values. 
Therefore, Romania has always been an integral part of European culture”.78 
Although the U.S. President George Bush had suggested the expansion of NATO 
beyond the then sixteen members by the early 1990s, nothing was proposed and 
applied in practice at the time. Until his election, the new U.S. President Bill Clinton 
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preferred to remain cautious but after being elected, he made a formal proposal to 
congress for NATO enlargement.79 However, by the end of the Cold War, NATO 
had pursued two important objectives in the southern region: first, “to establish a 
framework for bringing former Warsaw Pact nations into a closer relationship with 
the West and second, to develop special approaches for dealing with Russia”.80 
Although NATO enlargement formally promoted a security community in Central 
and Eastern Europe, informally, it aimed to extend US influence over Germany and 
to constrain Russian power in Southeast Europe. Therefore, to some extent, NATO’s 
expansion could be seen as a test for Russian will and historical strategic interest in 
the region.81  
Some of the Balkan nations were hesitant about Russian reaction concerning 
involvement with NATO. But Romania was successful in balancing its relations both 
with NATO and Russia. The country had always given a message that NATO should 
not be seen as a threat to Russia.82 In one of his speeches, the then Romanian Foreign 
Minister, Petre Roman, underlined the issue by saying: “The enlargement of NATO 
is directed towards strengthening security and cooperation in Europe and not against 
a particular country”.83 In other words, membership to the Alliance would not be a 
reason for Romania to be involved in a hostile action against Russia. On the contrary, 
Romania had to be more careful in its relations.84 Besides these, Romania had proven 
its insistence on admission to NATO by clearly indicating: “…no one (Russia) 
should have the right to veto or attach conditions to Romania’s integration into 
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NATO, since an independent and sovereign state enjoys unrestricted freedom in 
designing its security and defense policies”.85 
In order to develop relationships with the former Warsaw Pact nations, the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established at NATO’s November 1991 
Rome Summit. This was followed by the development of the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) program, launched at the January 1994 summit in Brussels.86 The main purpose 
of NACC was “to provide an overall framework for a growing political-military 
relationship between NATO and the Central European nations”. On the other hand, 
PfP had aimed to “implement specific activities, such as joint training and exercises, 
and perhaps over time to encourage such results as equipment interoperability”.87 In 
sum, these two institutions were preparatory steps for candidates to experience 
certain mechanisms within NATO and Romania was the first ex-communist state to 
join the PfP in January 1994.88  
For Romania, PfP could serve as an instrument for strengthening cooperation 
between NATO members and non-NATO European countries and a vehicle for 
NATO membership.89 Within this framework, the partnership could be a major 
advantage in terms of avoiding isolation, discrimination or creating a new 
geopolitical division in Europe.90 Romania had to adjust itself for taking part in joint 
military maneuvers and exercises. Therefore, Romanian armed forces, air force and a 
large number of elements of the navy were being trained and modernized for PfP 
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activities. The country has participated in numerous joint military exercises, 
involving troops. A Romanian engineering battalion has served in NATO’s 
IFOR/SFOR missions in Bosnia. It has sent troops to the southern part of Albania as 
part of the International Protection Force. Additionally, Romania actively 
participated in various peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations all over the 
world: in the Gulf, in Somalia, in Rwanda and in Angola. “Romania was one of the 
few countries in the world with troops deployed in three different international 
missions at the same time.”91 With more than 500 exercises and activities within the 
PfP, Romania became one of the “leaders” in this framework of cooperation.92  
In early July 1997, regarding NATO’s enlargement, President Clinton made an 
evaluation of twelve former Eastern bloc nations seeking admission to NATO: 
Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania and 
Slovenia and the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In the end, 
“only the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were found qualified because of their 
firm democratic footing, market economies and settlement of boundary and ethnic 
conflicts with their neighbors”. Therefore, NATO’s 1997 summit in Madrid started 
the Alliance’s enlargement process toward Central and Eastern Europe by endorsing 
an “open door” policy on future enlargements.93 
Although Romania was not nominated in Madrid, the summit gave the country a 
clear perspective for NATO membership and it was acknowledged by the majority of 
the states as a leading candidate of further NATO enlargement.94 However, the 
supporters of Romania’s inclusion in NATO’s first round of expansion expressed  
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their disappointment in Madrid since they argued that Romania was equally qualified 
as the three new NATO members, and that the country had satisfied the admission 
criteria in 1997. According to them, only the transition to a market economy was 
painful for Romania. After the Madrid summit, the Romanian people understood that 
“economic reforms must come as a prerequisite for admission to NATO, but that 
they would not come with admission to NATO.”95 The Alliance’s southern flank 
members were all impressed by the Romanian claims for preparedness to enter 
NATO and President Clinton assured Romania’s precedence in the next round of 
expansion in 1999.96 Following the summit in Madrid, Romania decided to 
accelarate reforms to enter the Alliance. According to Romanian Foreign Minister 
Adrian Severin, the country should emphasize the process of integration even more 
than in the past to prove Romania’s importance as a full NATO member.97 
The Washington Summit, held on 23-25 April 1999, welcomed initiatives 
designed to make the Partnership more operational and to give a chance for greater 
partner involvement in decision-making and planning phases.98 Membership Action 
Plan (MAP) was also launched at the Washington summit to guide the countries 
through the preparations for the rights and responsibilities that NATO membership 
would bring.”99 Therefore, Romania had at least reached a road map to follow for 
fulfilling the criteria. 
In addition to these, Romania, with other participating countries, submitted an 
annual national program on their preparations in political, economic, 
defence/military, resource, security and legal issues.  
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A national security strategy, in accordance with NATO Washington Summit 
documents, was prepared and presented to the parliament. This program called for 
defence reform which required the reorganization of armed forces by 2003, the 
modernization of equipment by 2007, the training of forces as professional and 
mobile, the development of rapid reaction forces and capabilities in particular 
strategic areas.100 Romania’s National Plan of Adherence (PNA) for the year 2001 
was found satisfactory by NATO officials in Brussels on November 10, 2000. They 
appreciated the country’s seriousness and mentioned the great chance of Romania for 
the next round of enlargement.101 
Although Romania was the last former communist country to establish 
diplomatic ties with NATO, it has been determined to become a NATO member.102 
The recent public opinion polls showed that nearly 85 percent of the population 
wants Romania in the Alliance. All the parties in the parliament issued a joint 
statement to make NATO membership Romania’s top foreign policy and national 
security goal.103 As for the NATO enlargement in the year 2002, Prime Minister 
Adrian Nastase stated that “there is no clear perspective whether NATO will enlarge 
in the year 2002 or it will include Romania or not.”104 However, Romania gives the 
message for its Western partners that: “We are ready to make an offer that is hard to 
refuse. We will keep the same pace of enhancing the security environment in our 
region, and we are determined to continue our NATO path, and therefore to represent 
an engine of continuity for the enlargement process.”105  
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However, the common issue most of NATO officials argue that the major 
problem in Romania’s admission process is the instability in the country's economy. 
Regarding the chance of Romania to become a NATO member in 2002 summit, 
NATO Deputy Secretary-General for political issues, Klaus Peter Klaiber warned 
that the next two-three years would be crucial for the creation of a viable economy. 
According to him, if the economic reforms were attained, the chance to get into 
NATO would be higher in the next summit.106    
 
     2.2 ROMANIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION  
     Romania’s traditional relations with the European Union go back to early 1970s. 
By concluding several technical accords in 1969, Romania had developed a legal 
framework in its relations with the European Community (EC). This was followed by 
customs arrangements on a wide range of goods in 1974. Additionally, on 1 January 
1981, Romania signed an accord with the EC on trading industrial goods (other than 
textiles and steel) and had become the first East European country on this issue.107 
     However, Romania’s relations with the EC slowed down in the 1980s. The main 
reason was the oppressive character of Ceausescu’s regime. Because of his 
isolationist and self-sufficiency policies, the EC decided to scale down its contacts 
with the country for a period of time. During the 1989 Revolution, the EC closely 
followed events in Romania and diplomatically protested against human right 
violations in the country.108 
     By the end of the revolution, the overthrow and execution of Ceausescu, the NSF 
issued a statement on 7 January 1990 in order to warm up relations and to renew 
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contacts with the Community. Although they concluded a new trade and cooperation 
accord on 10 June 1990, the EC again decided to freeze its relations with Romania as 
a result of continuing violence in the country. The fluctuations in the relations came 
to an end with the conclusion of a comprehensive trade agreement on 22 October 
1990. This agreement entered into force on 1 May 1991 and Romania became the 
last Warsaw Pact country to sign this accord.109 The first Romanian Ambassador to 
the EU was appointed in April 1990.110 
     In late 1991, diplomatic efforts became intensive about Romania’s possible 
association with the Community.111 Following number of negotiations, a Romanian 
delegation headed by Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu signed an Association 
agreement with the EC on 1 February 1993 in Brussels. Romania was ranked as the 
fourth former communist country after Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia to 
conclude such an accord with the EC. Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor 
Melescanu, the Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen and the EC 
Comissioner Sir Leon Brittan also signed a separate interim accord for regulating 
trade and economic relations until the Association agreement was approved by both 
the European Parliament and Romania’s Parliament.112 In June 1993, The European 
commission opened a Permanent Delegation in Bucharest.113 
     The Association agreement, the so-called the “Europe Agreement”, came into 
force on 1 February 1995. The Europe Agreement “provided the legal and 
institutional basis for the further development of relations between Romania and the  
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Community and clearly spelled out the main objective: to prepare Romania’s 
accession to the European Union (EU).”114 Romania hailed the Europe Agreement as 
an important act in the country’s foreign policy and a new beginning in Romania-EU 
relations. The Agreement could open the door for Romania to break out of a political 
isolation coming from its communist past. However, the EU preferred to be cautious 
in its future relations with the country and warned against the applications of human 
rights in general and the rights of minorities.115 
     The Europe Agreement led to speculations both among public and political elites. 
The agreement would serve to facilitate Romania’s access to the single European 
market by eliminating trade barriers between Romania and EU. This would provide 
Romania a key to enter the world’s largest market where goods, services, capital and 
labor circulated freely. Some of the people accepted the agreement as an advantage 
for increasing the speed of transformation from an over-centralized economy to a 
liberal one. According to them, with a rise in exports and an influx of technology and 
investments from the West, Romania could easily overcome the economic crisis in 
medium term.116  
     On the other hand, as stated in one daily called “Curierul National”, the Europe 
Agreement would “mark the beginning of tough competition in Romania’s 
economy…”117 This could be possible because of the inability of many domestic 
companies and industrial branches to compete in such a big market. While the 
nationalist forces, which continued to support Ceausescu’s policy of self-sufficiency, 
choose to emphasize these negative opinions, Romania’s political establishment 
remained determined to become a full member in the EU.118  
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     The Romanian government submitted its official request for accession to the EU 
on 22 June 1995. The consensus of all Romanian political groups were recorded in 
the Snagov Declaration in June 1995 and the National Strategy, including procedural 
steps and actions in the process of preparation for accession, was adopted. Romania 
had to fulfill the “Copenhagen Criteria”, set up by the European Council in June 
1993, to become a full member of the EU. Following year, in Essen, the Council 
presented “The Preparatory Strategy for the Associated countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe with the view to their Accession to the EU”. The European 
Commission prepared a Questionnaire in April 1996 to test the degree of 
preparedness of the candidate countries for accession and Romania forwarded its 
answers on 25 July 1996.119 
     After these procedures, the European Commission came with a proposal, 
requiring from each candidate state to submit an annual report on the progress of 
fulfilling the accession criteria.120 According to 1999 European Commission Report 
on Romania’s progress toward accession, Romania had no serious problems in terms 
of fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria except dealing with child care, the 
situation of Roma minority and corruption.121  
     The Commission decided to monitor the reforms of the Romanian government in 
terms of hygiene, medical care, nutrition, general assistance and infrastructure of the 
child care institutions.122 The Comission also required from Romanian government to 
control the living conditions of the Roma minority and to fight against illegal 
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discrimination in employment and education.123 Additionally, corruption and 
organized crime were growing challenges and the Commission wanted Romanian 
government to take certain measures. Regarding illegal issues, Romanian Minister of 
Interior Constantin Dudu Ionescu mentioned about the paralel economy in 1999 and 
stated that it constituted 25 to 40 percent of official economy.124  
     The European Commission’s report was not optimistic in drawing the economic 
picture in Romania. The Commission stated that “Romania cannot be considered as a 
functioning market economy and it is not able to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union in the medium term.”125 According to the report, 
certain amount of progress was achieved in the privatization of several large 
companies but these were not sufficient for solving financial problems in the country. 
Legal uncertainty also plugged the road of foreign private investments necessary to 
modernize the supply side of the economy. The Commission concluded that the 
creation of a more transparent and disciplined business environment should be 
established for increasing economic activity and living standards in the country.126  
     On the other hand, the “2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s 
progress toward Accession” pays attention to the poor social conditions in Romania 
and underlines that these negative elements stemmed from the lack of reform in the 
economy and weak economic infrastructure. It also mentioned rising unemployment, 
high inflation, low wages and the presence of a black market in Romania.127  
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     To conclude, Romania wants to join the EU for basicly security and prosperity. 
However, Romania is aware of the fact that “each state should join at its own speed, 
depending upon individual circumstances…” The Romanian economy is at the top of 
the EU agenda and the country has to wait until its economic indicators catch the EU 
norms.128  
     On the other hand, “people in their mid-forties and over cannot fit into a 
conventional market economy; they are scared of the market economy and 
competition.”129 These people understand democracy as unemployment, poverty and 
chaos. They explain that they were safe in the communist world if they kept their 
mouths shut. Thus, almost 64 percent of Romanians miss the rulership of communist 
dictator Nicolae Ceausescu.130 Again, the same Romanian people imagine their 
country in the EU as if there would be “money falling from the sky. Some think EU 
integration substitutes for reform and do not realize that economic improvements 
require an internal effort and not just handouts from abroad.”131  
     However, the reality is quite different than what the people imagine. The target of 
Romania is to complete the preparations and requirements until 2004 and to become 
a member of EU in 2007.132 It does not wish to be left behind but the answer of the 
European Commissioner for enlargement, Gunter Verheugen represents the reality: 
“The future of Romania belongs to the government and the Romanian people. There 
is no doubt that Europe will support the reforms, but it depends on Romania to 
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achieve this.”133 There is a glimmer of hope for Romania’s admission to the EU in 
the future but Romania has much to do before it becomes an EU member.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
A PERIOD OF CHALLENGE: ROMANIAN ECONOMY 
 IN THE 1990s 
    
     3.1 CHAOS IN ROMANIAN ECONOMY: THE LEGACIES OF                                 
           CEAUSESCU    
 
 
     By the beginning of the 1990s, the Romanian economy could be identified with 
three characteristic features that distinguished it from the other countries of Eastern 
Europe:134 It was a hypercentralised, socialist economy; had no external debt when 
Ceausescu fell, and was one of the countries in which the standard of living was very 
low. 
     The Romanian economy was defined as a hypercentralised, socialist economy 
because it was based on strict autarky and central planning, which was inflexible to 
the changing external conditions, new Western technologies and unrelated to either 
local needs or global economic realities. In addition, it represented Ceausescu’s 
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vision of a homogeneous socialist population by minimizing independence and scope 
for individual decision-making and maneuvering.135  
     Before the 1980s, there were signs of economic transformation and deterioration 
both in the 1960s and 1970s. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Romania had a 
backward agrarian economy. However, there were efforts to mechanise agriculture 
and to develop the manufacturing sector in the early 1960s. In order to realize this, 
huge numbers of underutilized labour in agriculture were transferred to the non-
agricultural sectors. The result of the shift was a rapid increase in productivity, even 
though productivity in the industrial sector could not reach international standards. In 
addition to the shift in the investment strategies in this period (see Table I for the 
investment patterns in the socialist sector in percentages), the location of new plants 
were changed from the traditional raw material-based centers of heavy industry to 
the capitals of countries with large agricultural population.136 
 
TABLE I.                        INVESTMENT PATTERNS IN THE SOCIALIST 
                                                           SECTOR IN PERCENTAGES 
 
        
Sector  1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85  
        
Industry  46,5 50 50,5 49,2 49  
Agriculture  19,4 16 14,4 13,8 16,5  
Contruction  3,4 3,9 4,7 5,9 3,9  
Transportation 8,8 10,3 10,2 10,6 11,3  
Communal housing 11,5 9,5 9,3 10,2 10,3  
Education & Culture 2,2 2 1,9 1,5 0,6  
Health  1,2 1,2 0,9 0,7 0,5  
Other sectors 6,9 7,1 8,1 8,1 8  
        
Source: Per Ronnas, “The Economic Legacy of Ceausescu”, in Economic Change in the Balkan States: 
Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, ed. Örjan Stöberg and Michael L. Wyzan, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1991,p.49. 
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     Towards the end of the 1970s, economic growth slowed down and investments 
declined considerably. The growth rate of national income fell from an average of 
over 9 percent in the 1970s to only 2 percent in 1980. Shortages of food products 
were widespread in the domestic market after 1979 (see Table II for economic 
development between 1970 and 1989).137  
 
TABLE II.                     ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN  
                                                               1970 AND 1989  
   
         
          
Indicator  Unit 1970 1980 1989 % yearly change 
      1970-80 1980-89  
Population  1.000 20,252.5 22,201.4 23,151.6 0.92 0,47  
Wage workers 1.000 5,108.7 7,340.0 7,996.6 3,69 0,96  
National income bil.lei 212.1 580.7 613.7 9,14 2,11  
Gross ind.prod. bil.lei 307.2 936.1 1,270.4 11,79 3,45  
Gross agr.prod. bil.lei 68.6 129.1 193.4 6,53 4,59  
Investments  bil.lei 80.0 210.5 236.4 10,16 1,30  
Steel  1000 tons 6,517 13,175 14,415 7,29 1,00  
Tractors  No 29,287 70,873 24,500 9,24 -11,13  
Cars  No 23,604 88,232 122,800 14,09 3,74  
TV sets  1.000 280 541 511 6,81 -0,64  
Shoes  1000 pairs 65,804 113,401 111,400 5,59 -0,28  
Meat  1000 tons 425 993 686 8,86 -4,03  
Milk  mil. Litres 433.6 732.5 568 5,38 -2,77  
Cooking oil  1000 tons 274 369 247 3,02 -4,33  
Refined sugar 1000 tons 377 509 693 3,05 3,49  
Butter  tons 30,700 34,600 45,600 1,21 3,10  
Cheese products tons 68,200 112,900 81,600 5,17 -3,54  
         
Source: Per Ronnas, “The Economic Legacy of Ceausescu”, in Economic Change in the Balkan States: 
Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, ed. Örjan Stöberg and Michael L. Wyzan, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1991,p.50. 
 
     All of the negative economic values in the late 1970s were reflected onto the 
values of 1980s and the bells indicating the beginning of an economic crisis began to 
ring in Romania. Beyond negative impacts of the 1970s, most of Ceausescu’s 
policies stood out as a major reason for the disastrous state of the Romanian 
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economy. To him, central planning mechanism and the need for state control of the 
economy were unquestionable and sacrosanct.138 
     Ceausescu’s insistence on the repayment of external debt in 1981 was one of the 
significant factors lying behind Romania’s economic failure. In order to clear the 
external debt, he decided to increase the exports and then to invest profits to debt 
instead of investing in technical modernization. Therefore, in the early 1990s, 
Romania became a country where one could find “great production capacity, mostly 
underemployed, equipped with the heavily polluting technology of the 1960s, 
lacking in spare parts, and consuming great quantities of electricity and 
manpower.”139 
     The re-exportation sector played a significant role in the losses of the Romanian 
economy. Between 1980 and 1989, the country imported a huge amount of raw 
materials especially for three major industrial branches (metallurgy, chemistry and 
oil), processed at a low quality level and then sold products wherever they could be 
sold without estimating production costs. The goal was to obtain any sum of foreign 
exchange to pay the external debt.140 
     Besides efforts of paying external debt, in early 1980s, a domestic energy crisis 
arose as a result of the increase in energy consumption of the highly energy-intensive 
industries. The household consumption of electricity was insufficient, thus small 
children and old people died from the cold in their homes in winter. The streets were 
dark at night and only single 40 watt bulbs were used in houses. In 1985, 3160 kwh 
of electricity per capita was produced in Romania, but it had slightly increased to 
3279 kwh/per capita in 1989. The problems in energy supply also affected the 
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irrigation capacity in agriculture and forced many industries to run less than full 
capacity. Oil imports increased from 2.3 million tons in 1970 to 16.0 million tons in 
1980, which led to a proportional increase in foreign debts.141 
     In this period, Romania’s agricultural performance was poor. The human resource 
base in agriculture had been transferred to industries, so inefficiencies occured both 
quantitatively and qualitatively (see Table III for the distribution of employment by 
sector). The transfer of labour from agriculture to the other economic sectors was not 
as beneficial as expected because the living conditions of agricultural population had 
not improved, leaving the rural-urban divide as large as ever.142  
 
TABLE III.                    DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR  
                                                        IN THOUSAND OR PERCENT  
 
         
       1970 1980 1985 1989  
           
Agriculture and Forestry  49,3 29,8 28,9 27,9  
Industry    23,1 35,5 37,1 38,1  
Construction    7,8 8,3 7,4 7,0  
Transport    3,6 6,1 6,0 6,2  
Telecommunications  0,6 0,8 0,8 0,8  
Trade and financial services  4,6 6,3 6,1 6,3  
Municipal services   3,1 3,8 4,1 4,9  
Education, culture and arts  3,7 4,2 3,9 3,4  
Healt care, social security, physicial culture and sport 2,3 2,7 2,7 2,7  
Science and scientific services  0,5 1,0 1,3 1,3  
Administration   0,7 0,6 0,5 0,5  
Other    0,8 1,0 1,2 1,1  
          
Total number    9,875.0 10,350.1 10,586.1 10,945.7  
          
Source: Romania:Human Resources and the Transition to a Market Economy, The World Bank, Washington DC, U.S.A,  
1992, p.166. 
 
     The worst of all these were the problems in the supply of food and staples 
stemming from the crisis in agricultural sector. The only visible solution for the  
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shortage of necessities was food rationing. It was introduced in 1981 but because of 
the large regional variations in supply and poor distribution system, it could not 
prevent the deterioration of the physical well-being of the population. For instance, 
in Cluj-Napoca, the largest city in Transylvania; 750 g of sugar, 0.5 lt of cooking oil, 
2 kg of potatoes, 0.5 kg of wheat flour and 1 kg of macaroni were distributed per 
person per month in June 1988. Bread was rationed to 300 g per person per day. 
Moreover, “all rations were subject to availability. Meat and dairy products were not 
formally rationed since there was nothing to ration.”143 Throughout the 1980s, the 
average lifespan was low and falling due to malnutrition, lack of medical facilities, 
pollution, poor and dangerous working conditions.144 
     Another important factor that contributed to both physical and psychological 
depression of people was rising levels of unemployment. This crisis became acute 
especially after 1987 and the percentage of non-wage workers in the labor force was 
increased from 0.4 in 1987 to 10.2 in 1988.145 
     To conclude, by the end of the 1980s, the quality of life went down as well as the 
power and hope of the people but economic statistics were systematically falsified by 
Ceausescu to convince people that everything was smooth and under the control of 
the state.146 There was a huge unsatisfied demand in the domestic market and 
hundreds of enterprises had serious difficulties in obtaining inputs. Because of 
inadequate input, Romania experienced a real decrease in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) from 856.9 billions of lei in 1988 to 798 billions of lei in 1989.147  
Nonetheless, the level of technology and the industrial infrastructure were stable. But 
for modernization efforts, currency reserves were not sufficient. In sum, there were 
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different kinds of secret repression on people and they would not remain silent for a 
long time. The disastrous economic situation might be one of the indicators of the 
1989 Revolution.  
 
     3.2 THE BEGINNING OF TRANSITION IN THE  
           ROMANIAN ECONOMY 
     With the demise of the communist system in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
region entered a period of transition from dictatorships and command economies 
towards democratic systems and free market economies. After decades of central 
planning, autarchy, bureaucracies and biased prices, transition should be towards the 
opposite of this system: privatization, foreign competition and free prices.148  
     Sandor Richter makes an explanation of transition in his book as “a typical 
“learning by doing” process, where the lessons were learnt from other countries, 
coping with similar problems…”149 The author states that, although the main actors 
of transition are more or less identical in all economies concerned, the internal 
conditions of each country, under which the specific programs were drafted, show 
considerable variations and play significant role in the length of the transition 
period.150  
     After the 1989 overthrow of the communist regime, Romania faced the challenge 
of transition much more than any other ex-socialist Central European country. The 
cumulative effects of the fully state-owned economy, hypercentralised management 
system, lack of Western technology and competitiveness of national production and 
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early repayments of foreign debt marked the beginning of a painful economic 
transformation period.151       
     Following the violent overthrow of Ceausescu in late 1989, the provisional 
Government decided to move rapidly to make certain reforms. However, there were 
a number of economic imbalances inherited from communist past. The publication of 
“Outline of Strategy for Transition to a Market Economy in Romania” by provisional 
Government in May 1990 and the Prime Minister’s reports to Parliament on October 
18, 1990 and on February 26, 1991 for the progress of economic reforms were 
regarded as landmarks in the development of the Romanian economy. The report  
prepared by the provisional Government clearly stated that “The transition to a 
market economy is desired not only by Government; there is now a national 
consensus on that point. All those who understand the complexity of the question 
agree that the transition must be prepared economically, financially, organizationally, 
and also in the area of legislation…”152 According to the report, the transition to a 
market economy could be held in two stages: “first, reform of the existing economic 
and institutional structures to those of a market economy; and second, modernization 
of the economy.”153 The time horizons of the two stages differed and the former was 
a prerequisite for the success of the latter. In sum, the main tasks were privatization, 
restructuring and growth, stabilization and introduction of market clearing prices.154 
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3.3 THE REFORM PROCESS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF 
ROMANIA IN THE 1990s 
     The Romanian economy was in trouble in the early 1990s. Although the GDP 
values between 1990 and 1992 were negative, it began to rise with a 1.5 percent in 
1993.155 Tight monetary policies, forced by IMF and World Bank, were successful in 
changing the 1994 and 1995 GDP’s to positive values and for the achievement of 
macroeconomic stabilization (see Table IV for GDP growth rate in percentage 
between 1990 and 2000).156 Proportional to the efforts for raising GDP and a 700 
million dollars loan issued by IMF in May 1994, the annual inflation rate decreased 
from 136.7 percent in 1994 to 32.3 percent in 1995 (see Table IV for annual inflation 
rate in percentages between 1990 and 2000).157 
 
 
 
TABLE IV.                        MAIN INDICATORS BETWEEN 1990 AND 2000    
             
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
              
GDP growth rate (%) -5,6 -12,9 -8,8 1,5 3,9 7,1 3,9 -6,6 -7,3 -3,2 1,6 
             
Annual inflation rate (%) 5,1 170 210 256 137 32,3 56,9 151 40,7 54,8 40,7 
             
Unemployment rate (%) - 3,0 8,2 10,4 10,9 9,5 6,6 8,8 10,3 11,5 10,5 
             
Source:http://www.rmdsz.ro/angol/current/strfin1.html; Doing Business in Romania (2001), p.9.,http://www.arthuranderson.ro 
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TABLE V.            FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN GROUPS OF COUNTRIES BETWEEN 
                                                       DECEMBER 1990 AND MARCH 1999 
Country Value of Investments (1000$) Number of Investors 
   
Holland 591 353,7 1021 
Germany  447 244,1 8115 
USA 306 961,7 2573 
Italy 303 564,1 7389 
France 290 032,9 1900 
South Korea 234 022,8 54 
Turkey 188 567,4 5600 
Austria 186 732,7 1829 
England 185 121,5 882 
Cyprus 176 057,8 584 
   
Source:Ebru Gülsoy, Romanya Ülke Raporu, İGEME (İhracatı Geliştirme Etüd Merkezi), Ankara, 2000, p.16. 
 
     On the other hand, privatization was one of the cornerstones but also one of the 
problematic sections of economic reform. The institutions, responsible for 
privatization in Romania, were the State Ownership Fund (SOF) and Romanian 
Development Agency.158 The privatization process starting from 1990 continued 
very slowly and most of the country’s industrial production remained in state hands 
in 1995. After considerable pressure from the IMF and the World Bank, the 
Romanian parliament issued a mass privatization program for transferring more than 
2000 companies to private ownership.159 However, the program was not completely 
successful since the SOF had privatized only around 3000 companies in early 1997 
from a portfolio of 8700 companies in 1992.160  In order to speed up the 
privatization, the government decided to take certain measures. The first initiative 
was the reorganization of the SOF. In April 1997, all the board members were 
replaced and the SOF was put under the direct control of state. Secondly, in January  
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1998, the parliament passed a privatization law with an extraordinary session. The 
law pointed out the reorganization of privatization bodies, increasing transparency in 
transactions, setting environmental protection conditions and so on.161  
     As a result of these measures, a number of transactions were made in mainly the 
sectors of metallurgy, oil refining, building materials, construction, textile, food 
packaging and plastics processing industries. The sale of 35 percent share of the 
Romtelecom (Romanian Telecommunications Company) to OTE (Greek 
Telecommunications Company); 51 percent share in the Romanian Development 
Bank to Societe Generale of France; the car manufacturer, Automobile Dacia, to 
Renault and a 45 percent stake in Banc Post to EFG Eurobank Ergasias, Banco 
Portugues de Investimento and GE Capital Corporation were important steps in the 
area of privatization in 1999. However, little progress was made in 2000. In 2001, 
private sector constitutes over 60 percent of the country’s GDP.162 
     In the second half of the 1990s, the real GDP began to decrease as a result of 
severe reductions in fixed investments and private consumption. The large fall in 
output, which were –6,6 in 1997 and -7,3 in 1998, changed the balances by 
increasing unemployment. The unemployment rate reached to 11.5 percent in 1999 
from 6.6 percent in 1996 (see Table IV for unemployment rate in percentages 
between 1990 and 2000).163 
     The slow pace of reforms affected the foreign investor’s portfolio in Romania. 
The investments have mainly been from European companies amounting to around 
80 percent of the total capital investment value (see Table V for foreign investments 
in groups of countries between December 1990 and March 1999).164 
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     Romanian foreign trade was subject to economic transformations in the 1990s. 
The importance given to exports in 1980s for the repayment of external debt was 
routed towards domestic market supplies. Therefore, a considerable decrease 
appeared in exports in the early 1990s.165 In imports, a similar decline occurred from 
9,202 million dollars in 1990 to 5,784 million dollars in 1992 (see Table VI for 
foreign trade in billion dollars). The fluctuating values in both exports and imports 
were replaced with gradually increasing numbers after 1993.166  When trade products 
are examined, textiles, ready-made clothes, leather goods, metallurgical products, 
machines and equipments, chemicals, rubber and plastics account for an important 
part of Romania’s both exports and imports with the EU countries (mainly Italy, 
Germany and France), Hungary, China, Egypt, Israel, South Korea, USA and 
Russia.167  
 
TABLE VI.                      FOREIGN TRADE IN BILLION DOLLARS    
            
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
            
Exports 5,8 4,3 4,4 4,9 6,1 7,9 8,1 8,4 8,3 8,5 9,5 
            
Imports 9,2 5,4 5,8 6,0 6,6 9,5 10,5 10,4 10,9 10,3 11,5 
            
Source:http://www.rmdsz.ro/angol/current/strfin1.html; Doing Business in Romania (2001), p.9.,http://www.arthuranderson.ro 
 
     To conclude, the Romanian economy played a diagnostic role in both domestic 
and foreign policies of the country in the 1990s. Although indicators of early 1990s 
created problems for Romania in the international arena and caused delays in 
membership to NATO and EU, the latest developments and coherent values seems 
hopeful for the future of the country. Besides internal reforms, establishing good 
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economic relations with other nations could be useful for Romania to establish a 
broader scope and vision. In fact, the target is the smooth transition of Romanian 
economy into a well-structured, functioning market system step by step, first 
reorganizing itself and then adapting to other international institutions.    
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 ROMANIA’S REGIONAL POLITICS IN THE 1990s         
    
      4.1 AN ERA OF RAPPROCHEMENT IN ROMANIA’S BALKAN POLICY 
 
 
     With the demise of the communist system in Central and Eastern Europe, 
Romania entered a period of transition in social and economic processes: from 
dictatorship to democracy and from the command economy to a free market 
economy. “New social and cultural values emerged and traditional mentalities 
regenerated: anti-communism; democracy and national identity; trust and respect 
towards fellow citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin; trust and respect towards 
neighboring countries and peoples. Therefore, for Romania, the national interest 
incorporated a set of values centered on the three pillars of statehood: democracy, 
security and prosperity.”168  
     During the 1990s, taking these values as a basis in its foreign policies, Romania’s 
Balkan policy was mainly composed of  “the development of the good-neighborly 
relations with all the Southeast European states, in order to consolidate stability, 
security and cooperation in its geographical area and to integrate it into the European 
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and Euro-Atlantic Structures; the encouragement of the democratic developments in 
the region.”169 In addition to these, specifically, it aims to give its support in the 
Balkans for:  
i. Widening the opportunities for prosperity for all the peoples in Southeastern 
Europe; by fostering a more stable regional security environment,  and 
encouraging implicitly the creation of a pool of investment in this 
geographical area, 
ii. Giving priority to projects based on a solid participation of the local private 
business in the reconstruction process, 
iii. Strengthening cooperation mechanisms for a joint fight against organized 
crime, corruption and illegal cross-border trafficking, as an essential 
condition for an increased regional, political and economic security, 
iv. Building a climate of increased confidence and cohesion by strongly 
supporting new democracies, by sharing what is called democratic road maps 
between the countries of the region, and consolidating the role and actions of 
the civil society.170 
     “The largest and most populous country in the region (237,500 km2 and 22,5 
million people in 1999), Romania has promoted a coordinated strategy for the 
reconstruction and prosperity of the Southeastern Europe. First of all, it was 
necessary for Romania to build confidence and trust in the region which were 
lacking in the history of the Balkans.”171 Therefore, Romania had actively 
participated in the sub-regional cooperation initiatives such as Southeast European  
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Cooperation Process (SEECP), Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI), 
Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Process of Stability 
and Good-Neighbourly Relations in Southeastern Europe (Royaumont Process) and 
Central European Initiative (CEI).172 The country strengthened its uniting attempts 
by taking part in the initiatives of trilateral cooperation such as Romania-Bulgaria-
Greece, Romania-Bulgaria-Turkey and so on.173 
     For Romania, building stability, security and prosperity in the region carried 
utmost importance since living in such a peaceful environment would also 
contribute to the political, economic and social development of the country as well. 
The core example of Romania’s efforts for establishing peace in the region was the 
country’s realistic attitudes during the Yugoslav Wars of Dissolution. Romania was 
in an uncomfortable position since it had to act quickly by making a choice among 
two options: either to follow UN embargo against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) or to take part on the other side because of traditional good 
relations and economic ties with the FRY. Romania did not hide its political 
sympathies for Serbia but this time “the potential economic and political advantages 
from supporting NATO far outweighted sentimental ties to Serbia.”174 
     The decision to join in the UN embargo on 3 June 1992 was costly enough for 
Romania because the country suffered economically. The energy sector was the most 
important aspect of Romanian-Yugoslav exchange. Yugoslavia imported 13-15 
percent of its oil needs from Romania.175 In 1991, the volume of trade between the 
two countries had reached to 440 million dollars, with Yugoslavia exporting goods 
nearly 269 million dollars to Romania.176 Therefore, Romania was right in its unease 
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since the losses from the economic blockade against FRY were approximately 300-
350 million dollars.177 Besides, Romanian officials were afraid of Yugoslavia’s 
breakup “to encourage seperatist tendencies among Romania’s ethnic minorities, 
especially among the Hungarians in Transylvania.”178 Despite of all these negative 
factors, Romania insisted on following US initiatives and respecting UN sanctions. 
The attitude of the country could be counted as its strong enthusiasm towards 
Western institutions. Romania had understood that “it would lose more if it turned its 
back on NATO.”179 
     From the very beginning, the country did not support any military involvement in 
the Balkans and on every occasion, it underlined the importance of finding peaceful 
solutions by regional and international initiatives to the Yugoslav crisis.180 Romania 
was not alone in its decision since the Balkan nations such as Greece, Bulgaria nad 
Turkey came together many times in Bucharest and declared that “the only solution 
(to the Yugoslav crisis) is a political one rather than engaging in a military 
confrontation.”181 They stressed the importance of acting in harmony for throwing 
the seeds of conflict and establishing peace in the region. 
     Besides playing an active role in regional structures of cooperation, Romania was 
aware of the fact that bilateral relations with other states could increase its 
capabilities militarily, diplomatically and economically, or that they could enhance 
Romania’s international prestige.182 Hence, Romania broke its distanced relations 
with its neighbours by the end of the Cold War. It tried to improve its relations with  
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Balkan nations and searched for opportunities of cooperation. In the 1990s, 
Romania’s relations with Turkey and Greece developed in political, military and 
economic fields.  
 
      4.2 TURKISH-ROMANIAN RELATIONS IN THE 1990s 
     Until the end of the Cold War, Turkey and Romania did not really struggle for an 
intensive cooperation in economic, political and military fields. The official visits, 
especially after 1960s, were treated as warm-up tours between the two countries.        
     Following the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the political, economic 
and social transformation of Eastern Europe and the emergence of violent ethno-
national conflicts in the Balkans, Turkey and Romania changed the route and 
structure of their relations. For instance, Turkey adopted diplomatic activism in its 
foreign policy in the early 1990s. In this period, Turkish foreign policy makers were 
convinced that establishing good political and economic relations with as many 
Balkan countries as possible and active contribution to stability in the region was 
definitely in Turkey’s national interest. However, Turkey’s search for a larger 
regional role through expanded bilateral ties with Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and 
Albania was partly the product of the competition and rivalry between Turkey and 
Greece.183 
     The conclusion of the “Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation 
Agreement” in September 1991 marked the beginning of the intensive relations 
between Turkey and Romania. Especially, after the fall of Ceausescu regime, 
relations improved with at least yearly regular meetings of the presidents of both 
countries. In these high-level meetings and visits, numerous agreements and 
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protocols were signed between Turkey and Romania. The most important ones can 
be listed as: “Agreement on Social Security (July 1999) ”, “Protocol on Joint 
Cooperation between Labour and Social Security Ministry and the Romanian Social 
Protection Security (July 1999)”, “Agreement on Consulates (July 1999)”, 
“Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology (July 1999)” and the 
“Protocol which target at Cooperation between Turkish and Romanian Justice 
Ministries (September 2000).184 
     Romania’s efforts for NATO membership and both countries’ drive to become 
European Union members strengthened Turco-Romanian political dialogue. Besides 
Turkey’s permanent and unconditional support for Romania’s membership to 
NATO, the two countries exchange their views on the protection of democracy and 
human rights. Turkey and Romania have also satisfactory political cooperation to 
struggle against terrorism and organized crime. In 1997, Turkey, Romania and 
Bulgaria signed a trilateral agreement on a joint fight against illegal operations.185 
Within this framework, Romania fully supports Turkey to put an end to the presence 
of the outlawed Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) on Romania’s soil. “Romanian 
authorities intensified efforts to crack down on the PKK and its affiliates in Romania 
and have extradited a number of PKK members to Turkey.”186 Turkish President 
Süleyman Demirel thanked Romanian President Emil Constantinescu in one of his 
visits to Turkey by saying: “Romania has always supported Turkey in the struggle 
against terrorism and organized crime. The Romanian security forces operation 
against groups affiliated with the PKK on April 27, 1999, was one of the concrete 
proof of Romania’s efforts.”187  
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     Besides political and economic relations, Turkey established tight and intensive 
military ties with Romania after the end of the Cold War. Military relations between 
the two countries developed especially with the official visit of Turkish General Staff 
to Romania in 1992. Following this date, the two countries accelerated their military 
cooperation by holding frequent official meetings and visits. As a result of these 
visits, Romania and Turkey have signed seven military agreements. They still 
continue to negotiate on three military agreements which are just drafts.188 
     Additionally, on each visit, Turkish and Romanian officials underline the two 
countries cooperation in defence industry and training of military personnel. They 
also seek opportunities and facilities to improve their cooperation in defence industry 
infrastructure.189 In one of his official visits to Turkey, the Romanian Defence 
Minister Sorin Frunzaverde, exchanged views on the military cooperation between 
Turkey and Romania within NATO and stated that: “The Romanian army is in 
modernization and reconstruction process and that their target is fully abiding by  
NATO standards. Therefore, Turkey’s support is very important at this stage. The 
two countries are the elements of stability in Southeastern Europe and the Balkans 
and that the military cooperation has an important place in the relations of the two 
countries.”190 To sum up, in the 1990s, the improvements in Turkish-Romanian 
military relations were apperant as in other fields and this could be evaluated as 
necessary and beneficial for the re-structuring process of the Balkans. 
     On the other hand, Romania aimed to reorganize its economic and trade relations 
with all the Balkan states to fasten its adaptation into open market economy as well 
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as its integration into the European structures, mainly the EU and the NATO.191 In 
this period, Turkey was also searching the ways of exploiting the markets of newly 
democratic states in the Balkans. In turn, the fragile economies of the Balkan 
countries could benefit from Turkey’s rapidly developing industry and business.192  
     Before 1990s, Turkish-Romanian trade relations was not so active and they were 
operating on the basis of five bilateral trade agreements that were signed by the two 
countries in this period. Following Romania’s transformation into open market 
economy, the two countries’ trade relations had accelerated. Agreement for “The 
Protection and Development of Mutual Investments”, which was signed on January 
24, 1991, marked the beginning of the intensive economic cooperation between 
Turkey and Romania (see Table VII for Trade Agreements and Protocols signed 
between Turkey and Romania).193 
 
TABLE VII.                 TRADE AGREEMENTS AND PROTOCOLS SIGNED  
                                            BETWEEN TURKEY AND ROMANIA  
  
Name of the Agreement Date of Signature 
Trade Agreement 27.10.1970 
The long term Technical and Industrial Cooperation Agreement 29.08.1975 
International Highway Transportation Agreement 06.09.1976 
Agreement for the prevention of Double Taxation 07.01.1986 
The long term Technical and Industrial Cooperation Agreement 20.10.1987 
Agreement for the support and protection of Mutual Investments 24.01.1991 
Free Trade Agreement 29.04.1997 
Transcript of the Agreement 19.06.1998 
The protocol of 19th period meeting of  
Turkish - Romanian joint economic committee 07.06.1999 
  
Source:..."Türkiye - Romanya Ticari ve Ekonomik İlişkilerinde Gündem Konuları", 
T.C.Başbakanlık Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı, Anlaşmalar Genel Müdürlüğü, October 2000, p.2. 
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     In the early 1990s, large number of Turkish companies entered Romanian market 
in order to fill the gaps stemming from “ Ceausescu’s communist programs”. The 
Romanian market was attractive for Turkish investors mainly because of three 
factors: 194 
i. People were acting indecisively and they were experiencing certain 
difficulties in obtaining basic needs such as foods, clothing and so on. 
Therefore, the investors could exploit the market easily,  
ii. In order to enter the Romanian market and open an office there, one should 
pay only a thousand dollars as a guarantee thus it was easier for investors to 
pay this amount and make business in Romania, 
iii. Foreign investors had been exempted from taxes for two years. 
     Under these conditions, many small Turkish companies entered the market and 
made their investments and operations in the areas of transportation, tourism, 
banking, leasing, insurance, construction infrastructures, production of plastics 
materials and electrical equipment, food processing, restaurant and casino 
management and packing industry.195  
     In the first half of the 1990s, the export and import values between the two 
countries were fluctuating. However, at the end of 1995, Turkey’s exports to 
Romania were increased from $175,265,000 to $301,960,000 and imports increased 
from $228,911,000 to $367,870,000 (see Table VIII for Turkish-Romanian Foreign 
Trade(1000$)).196 The products that Romania imports from Turkey can be listed as: 
Rutaceae, carpets, textiles, cleaning materials, canned vegetables, iron-steel products, 
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copper ores and concentrations. However, Romania’s exports to Turkey are 
composed of petrol by-products, chemicals, iron-steel scraps, wheat, seeds of 
sunflowers, bombs, mines and similar war munitions (see Table IX for Turkey’s 
Foreign Trade in groups of goods for the period of January-May 2000).197  
 
TABLE VIII.     TURKISH - ROMANIAN FOREIGN TRADE (1000 $) 
   
YEARS  EXPORT IMPORT 
1992 173,076 256,107 
1993 151,898 300,775 
1994 175,265 228,911 
1995 301,960 367,870 
1996 314,045 441,290 
1997 358,783 394,087 
1998 467,561 344,288 
1999 268,295 401,158 
1999/8 171,066 227,453 
2000/8 205,940 450,323 
Change   
97/98(%) 30,32 -12,64 
98/99(%) -4,264 16,53 
99/00(%) 20,3 97,9 
   
Source:..."Türkiye - Romanya Ticari ve Ekonomik İlişkilerinde Gündem Konuları", 
T.C.Başbakanlık Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı, Anlaşmalar Genel Müdürlüğü, October 2000, p.2. 
   
    Turkish-Romanian cooperation in economy and finance in the early 1990s 
indicated that the two countries could further develop the current potential. After 
1995, one of the important factors, which has made a valuable contribution to the 
enhancement of the two countries’ economic relations was the conclusion of the 
“Free Trade Agreement” on March 29, 1997. The trade balances had been positively 
affected after the agreement came into force on February 01, 1998. Turkey’s exports 
increased by 12% and imports decreased by 8% in this period (see Table X for 
Turkish-Romanian Trade before and after the Free Trade Agreement($).198 
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TABLE IX.        TURKEY'S FOREIGN TRADE IN GROUPS OF GOODS   
                                  FOR THE PERIOD OF JANUARY - MAY 2000  
   
EXPORT 1000$  
Wheat 11,506  
Rutaceae 10,242  
Carpets 8,151  
Automobiles 7,332  
Tomato 3,611  
Soaps, organic active materials 3,142  
Copper ores and concentrations 2,570  
Synthetic yarns 2,556  
Synthetic fibers 2,506  
Canned vegetables 2,103  
Others 74,91  
Total 128,629  
   
Source:..."Türkiye - Romanya Ticari ve Ekonomik İlişkilerinde Gündem Konuları",  
T.C.Başbakanlık Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı, Anlaşmalar Genel Müdürlüğü, October 2000, p.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE X.        TURKISH - ROMANIAN TRADE BEFORE AND AFTER   
                                        THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT($)   
   
 EXPORT  
August 1996-January 1999 529,001,104  
February 1998-July 1999 591,332,962  
Change(%) 12  
   
Source:Ebru Gülsoy, "Romanya Ülke Raporu",İhracatı Geliştirme Etüd Merkezi (İGEME), Ankara, March 2000, p.34. 
   
 
     In addition to these, the conclusion of the “Free Trade Agreement” attracted many 
Turkish investors thus small-scale companies were replaced by leading Turkish 
companies in the second half of the 1990s. According to December 31, 1999 
statistics, the number of Turkish companies in Romania was 6139 and the total value 
of their investments was 192.869 million dollars. Efes Pilsen, Bayındır Holding, Pak 
Holding, Bayraktar Holding, ENKA, Koç Holding, Hayat Holding A.Ş., Akmaya 
Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. were the most important entrepreneurs in Romania. 
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Therefore, Turkey was ranked as the 10th country in Romania among other foreign 
investors.199  
     If the investment areas of the Turkish companies are examined, it can be seen that 
most of the leading Turkish investors preferred to operate in banking sector. Turkish 
banks, which are operating in Romania, are basicly Banco Turco Romana (BTR) by 
Bayındır Holding, Robank by Bayraktar Holding, Demir-Romanya, United Garanti, 
Sümerbank and Finansbank. Additionally, “Global Menkul Kıymetler” is operating 
with only one office in Romania.200  
     Among these banks, Banco Turco-Romana (BTR) played an important role and 
contributed to the improvement of the two countries’ trade relations. Banco Turco-
Romana had been opened a few years ago in Bucharest in order to support Turkish 
companies, which do business in Romania and it has 7000 customers, 60% of them 
being companies.201 However, the crisis of BTR at the end of November 2000 
slightly shaked the relations between Turkey and Romania. Hundreds of worried 
deposit holders have lined up in front of BTR branches throughout Romania, trying 
to withdraw their money. Bayındır Holding transferred 90 million dollars to the BTR 
to solve its liquidity problems and limited the payments to 3000 dollars per person or 
equivalent in lei.202 Especially, the ungrounded rumours made clients unconfident, 
generated panic and created tension between Turkey and Romania. The Turkish and 
Romanian Governments acted together to prevent aggression, misunderstandings and 
tried to calm down the investors and clients of the BTR.203 Because the issue became 
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a “crisis of confidence” and affected Turkey’s prestige in that country, Bayındır 
Holding transferred and sold most of its investments both in Turkey and Romania.204  
     In turn, the total number of Romanian companies operating in Turkey is eleven 
according to the statistics of 2000. These companies’ share of investments in Turkey 
among the total foreign investments is 0,3%. They are interested in the economic 
projects in Turkey, especially in energy and infrastructure. They also operate in 
services and manufacturing industry.205 
 
      4.3 ROMANIA’S RELATIONS WITH GREECE IN THE 1990s 
     Romania and Greece had friendly relations in their history. Stemming from their 
historical ties, after the fall of communist dictatorship in Romania, Greeks thought of 
this country as an important member of the Orthodox alliance in the Balkans.206 
Greece, as a Southeastern European and Mediterranean country situated at a 
traditional crossing point of countries and as the sole regional member of both the 
EU and NATO, has a crucial role and a unique position for the regional economic 
prosperity and integration.207 Therefore, it could contribute to Romania’s economic 
transformation and development process and support the country’s integration efforts 
to the international institutions. 
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     In the early 1990s, the two countries held a number of official visits and signed 
economic, political, military and cultural agreements.208 Basic agreements concluded 
between Greece and Romania can be listed as:209 
• Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Agreement signed on 
28.11.1991, 
• Law-and-Order Cooperation Agreement signed on 06.06.1992, 
• Partnership in Tourism Agreement signed on 09.06.1993, 
• Technical and Scientific Partnership Agreement signed on 14.12.1993, 
• Partnership in Culture, Science and Education Agreement signed on 03.11.1995, 
• Agreement for the “Protection and Development of Mutual Investments” signed 
on 23.05.1997, 
• Defence Agreement signed on 27.03.1997, 
• Agreement on Cooperation in health care signed on 16.06.1999, 
• Agreement on Mutual assistance and Partnership of Customs Departments of 
Greece and Romania signed on 10.10.1999.210 
     “The integration process of the Balkan area into European structures is of great 
strategic importance to Greece, since it has facilitated, to a great extent, the re-
establishment of its historic ties with the region and, more importantly, has rendered 
Greece as the Balkan region’s European model for economic and democratic 
reforms. Moreover, the integration of the countries of Southeast Europe with the rest 
of the continent will greatly contribute to the stability, well-being and prosperity of 
Europe as a whole.”211 In this context, Greece, in its all negotiations with Romania 
                                                          
208 Ministry of Trade and Investment of Romania, Western European Department and the Department 
of Economic Relations of the EU member states, October 1999. 
209 ibid. 
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and official visits to Romania, expressed its support for the integration of Romania to 
those European institutions.212 
     The other aspect of Greek-Romanian exchange in the 1990s was their economic 
cooperation. With the fall of communism, Romania became aware of the fact that it 
was necessary to improve economic and technological conditions of the country in 
order to close the gap with the developed countries. The economic well being of the 
country was also needed for its quick admission to the NATO, EU and other 
European Institutions.213 For Greece, “the end of the Cold War opened great 
opportunities in commerce and trade and developed bilateral relationships both at the 
state and societal levels.”214 Greece, as well as promoting collective security in its 
foreign policy in the Balkans, also decided to give economic aid to the ailing 
economies of the Balkan countries in their transformation period. 
     By the beginning of 1990s, Greek companies turned to the Balkans and over 3500 
Greek enterprises have invested in the region, including leading names such as OTE 
state telecom, Hellenic Petroleum, Titan Cement, Intracom, Hellenic Bottling 
Company, Chipita and so on.215 Greece’s investments in Romania especially made 
her one of the countries with the highest level of economic cooperation with this 
country. The investment areas that most of the Greek companies invested in Romania 
are mainly telecommunication, food sector, non-ferrous metal industry, banking and 
services. The most leading partnership activities that were realized can be listed as:216 
• The establishment of the “Bucuresti” Bank (former name) or Alfha Bank with 
Greek capitals, 
                                                          
212 “Greece backs Romania bid to join EU”, Reuters, 31.04.1994. 
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215 “Big Business in Balkans”, Kathimerini, 10.11.2000. 
216 Ministry of Trade and Investment of Romania. Western European Department and the Department 
of Economic Relations of European Union Member States, October 1999. 
 64
• The establishment of the partnership company of “BUTANGAZ” by Petrogaz 
Atena and Competrol Bucuresti, 
• The investments of Delta Atena company in food sector, 
• The construction of the meat factory in Bucharest by İFANTİS company, 
• The establishment of the branch of Greek Central Bank in Bucharest(May 1998), 
• The establishment of the branch of “Pireus Bank” in Bucharest, 
• The investments of the “Mytileneos Holding” in non-ferrous metal industry, 
• The purchase of %35 of the ROMTELECOM (Romanian Telecommunications 
Company) by OTE (Greek Telecommunications Company) in 1998. 
     Besides all these investments, there are many other projects and business 
negotiations, which are just in the bargaining process. These are mainly the 
cooperation with Greece’s “ALMA” company in shoe sector, “BILLPA” company’s 
negotiation for investment in the “home products” in Romania, Romania’s 
participation in the operations of the Greece’s railroad electricity, financial 
investments of Greece for the construction of “Bucharest-Giurgiu” highway and so 
on.217  
      Certain activities organized by the two countries made their trade relations and 
economic cooperation valuable and fruitful. Romania’s participation with an 
advertisement stand in Selanik International Exposition in Sepember 1999; the 
economic organization of the Romania’s Chamber of Commerce in Athens by the 
contribution of 30 companies; Greece’s participation in the TİB 1998, TİBCO 1998, 
TİBCO 1999 and TİBCO 2000 fairs in Romania and many others can be given as an 
example to the economic activities between Greece and Romania.218 
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    On the other hand, trade values between the two countries were also steadily 
increasing. According to calculations of 31 July 2000, Greece was ranked as the 8th 
country with 365,59 million dollars in Romania’s total trade. She was the 8th (184 
million dollar)and 10th (181,59 million dollar) country in Romania’s exports and 
imports respectively. If the last two years values are compared (the first 7 months of 
1999 and 2000), it can be concluded that the total trade volume approximately 
increased by 67,24 percent, specifically 62,11 percent exports and 72,78 percent 
imports. (see Table XI for Romania-Greece exports and imports).219  
 
TABLE XI.   ROMANIA - GREECE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS  
IN MILLION DOLLARS 
 
     
YEARS EXPORT IMPORT TOTAL  
     
1989 143,2 36,4 179,6  
1991 64,5 90,7 155,2  
1992 115 74,2 189,2  
1993 81,3 69,2 150,5  
1994 141,2 89,5 230,7  
1995 205 158,3 363,3  
1996 177,35 185,72 363,07  
1997 174,93 191,92 366,85  
1998 201,4 204,7 406,1  
1999 216,74 198,49 415,23  
July 2000 184 181,59 365,59  
     
Source:Ministry of Trade and Investment of Romania ,   
Department of Economic Relations of European Union Member States, 1999. 
 
     To conclude, by the end of the Cold War, the Balkan nations changed their 
policies with regard to respective changes in the region. They agreed on the common 
point of establishing peace, stability, security and prosperity in the Balkans. 
                                                          
219 ibid.  
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Therefore, most of the countries, including Romania, developed meaningful and 
outstanding ties in this period. 
     Romania was an advantageous country in terms of its size and population for 
many countries to make investments. Turkey and Greece were two of them that 
developed examplary political, military and economic dialogue with this country. In 
terms of Romania, the support of Greece and Turkey were beneficial in Romania’s 
membership process to the EU and NATO. They were also good partners for guiding 
the country in its political and economic transformation into democratic and 
European structures. 
     As a result, Romania represented a real model in terms of its relations with other 
nations which was based on friendship, trust, and mutual respect and strived for 
achieving stability and prosperity in the Balkans. 
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     CONCLUSION 
 
     After 45 years of communism, a new era began for Romania at the end of Nicolae 
Ceausescu’s and his family’s reign after the 1989 Revolution. During Ceausescu’s 
dictatorship, Romania’s political capability was constrained by the country’s relative 
isolation from the West, by disastrous economic conditions and by the lack of a firm 
domestic political consensus.  Romania’s poor image was a product of the country’s 
bureaucracy, disorder, socio-political instability, strikes and corruption. 
     With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the emergence of newly democratic 
states in the early 1990s, remarkable changes occurred in Central and Southeast 
Europe. The countries in the region tried to adapt to the changing climate of the 
Balkans. One of those countries, which entered a period of transition in social, 
political and economic fields, was Romania. “New social and cultural values 
emerged and traditional mentalities regenerated: anti-communism, democracy and 
national identity; trust and respect towards fellow citizens, irrespective of their ethnic 
origin; trust and respect towards neighboring countries and people…”220 
     Romania wanted to become a reliable partner with Europe and the US regarding 
its human and economic potentials, a stability factor by developing normal relations 
with the neighbor states and to become integrated into the West-European 
institutions.221 Therefore, in the early 1990s, Romania made considerable changes in 
its foreign, security and economic policies. 
     Romania’s involvement in the European integration process was and still is the 
basic orientation of the country’s foreign policy. Like many other Balkan nations 
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emerging from communist ideology and Cold War geopolitics, Romania placed 
membership to NATO and EU as a priority in the strategic objectives of its security 
and defense policy.222 Romania showed great interest for admission to both NATO 
and EU since they represented a security and prosperity environment and the 
formations of democratic countries that had very well defined values (democracy, 
individual liberty and the rule of law) on the international platform. 
     On the other hand, the economic imbalances in Romania, which were inherited 
from the rulership of Ceausescu based on strict autarky and central planning, began 
to improve with regard to respective changes and reforms in the country. During the 
1990s, with the efforts of increasing privatisation programs, strengthening trade 
relations and establishing economic ties as far as possible, Romania experienced a 
revitalization process in its economy. 
     For Romania, it was necessary to build confidence and trust in the region which 
were absent in the history of the Balkans.223 Living in a stable, secure and prosperous 
environment would contribute to the political, economic and social development of 
Romania as well. Therefore, Romania had actively participated in regional structures 
of cooperation such as SEECP, SECI and BSEC by also taking part in the initiatives 
of trilateral cooperation with Bulgaria, Turkey and Greece. Furthermore, Romania 
was aware of the fact that bilateral relations with other states could increase its 
capabilities militarily, diplomatically and economically or they could enhance 
Romania’s international prestige.224 Hence, in order to put an end to the isolationist 
policies of the communist era, Romania tried to improve its relations with Balkan 
nations and searched for opportunities of cooperation. In the 1990s, Turkey and 
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Greece were good examples for its intensive political, military and economic ties in 
the region. 
     In general terms, during the 1990s, Romania struggled for closing the 
accumulated gaps inherited from the communist period, in each structure of the 
country. First of all, the Romanian economy played a diagnostic role in both 
domestic and foreign policies of the country in this period. The Romanian economy 
is also at the top of the EU agenda and the country has to wait until its economic 
indicators catch the EU norms. This is the same case for Romania’s NATO 
membership. Although Romania is so insistent and coherent for becoming a NATO 
member, the length of the process will vary with respect to the success of Romania in 
the creation of a viable economy. The public opinion polls reflect Romania’s 
enthusiasm for NATO and EU membership once more but the common issues that 
most of the officials emphasize in this process are the continuation of the reforms, 
preparations and the support of the government and the Romanian people. However, 
it can be underlined that the target should be the smooth transition of Romanian 
economy into a well-structured, functioning market system step by step, first 
reorganizing itself and then adapting to other international institutions. 
     In addition to these, Romania represented a real model in terms of its relations 
with other nations, which were based on friendship, trust, and mutual respect and 
strived for achieving stability and prosperity in the Balkans. From this perspective, it 
can be beneficial for Romania to improve its bilateral relations in terms of getting the 
support of those countries in the membership process to the NATO and EU  and in 
the transition period which can be expressed as continuing for the country. 
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